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ORIGINAL SIN, RADICAL EVIL AND 
MORAL IDENTITY 
Philip L. Quinn 
In this paper, I consider Kant's theory of radical evil as an attempt to rationalize 
the Christian doctrine of original sin. As I read Kant, he is committed to the view 
that some ways of understanding the doctrine of original sin express in an in-
adequate fashion an important truth about human moral character. His project in 
Book One of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is to formulate that truth 
within the bounds of reason drawn by his mature practical philosophy. The project 
is executed with Kant's characteristic subtlety and originality. It is astonishing to 
discover how much of what seems gripping in the intuitions which underlie the 
doctrine of original sin can be accommodated within the limits of Kantian reason. 
Yet, as I shall argue, the project ultimately fails, for its execution leads Kant into 
inconsistency. This inconsistency, however, is itself instructive because it illumi-
nates starkly a severe tension within certain Christian views of moral character, a 
tension Kant was too sensitive to ignore but unable to resolve. 
Put rather simply, the doctrine of original sin says that all humans, except 
Adam, Eve, Mary and Jesus, are born bearing a burden of sin and, hence, guilt. 
But it seems impossible that anyone should literally be sinful and guilty antecedent 
to having acted wrongly. And so, on the face of it, it looks as though the doctrine 
of original sin is incoherent. Lazy intellects may be tempted to suggest that the 
doctrine should nonetheless be believed as a mystery of faith and to leave it at that. 
But the solution of the lazy intellect is too quick to be philosophically acceptable. 
If some version of the doctrine is to be worthy of our belief, it must at least be in-
ternally consistent, that is, the propositions formulating it must be mutually con-
sistent, and externally consistent, that is, it must also be consistent with everything 
else we know. Of course, this does not mean that a Christian has an epistemic duty 
to abandon belief in any particular version of the doctrine merely because it looks 
as though it is incoherent. A version of the doctrine may be both internally and ex-
ternally consistent despite appearances to the contrary. Arguments which purport 
to establish internal inconsistency may be unsound, and claims of external incon-
sistency may be based on mistaken views of what else we do know. But the 
methodological moral for Christian philosophers is that, at minimum, it is in the 
long run incumbent upon them to defeat arguments intended to show that the doc-
trine is internally or externally inconsistent if they wish to hold that in the long run 
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believing the doctrine is not irrational. 
Christian philosophers might hope to achieve a bit more. To secure some ver-
sion of the doctrine of original sin against arguments for its internal or external in-
consistency it would be sufficient to show that the version in question is internally 
and externally consistent. Or it might be argued that a doctrine very much like trad-
itional versions of the doctrine of original sin is both internally and externally con-
sistent, and for that reason that doctrine might be recommended for belief as a ra-
tional replacement for the traditional doctrine. Kant's aim, I think, is to achieve 
this much and a bit more. His doctrine of radical evil is intended as a rational re-
placement for traditional versions of the doctrine of original sin. He recommends it 
for belief on the grounds that it is internally consistent, that it is externally consis-
tent with everything we can know within the framework of his mature practical 
philosophy, and that, in addition, it is supported by inductive evidence to the ex-
tent such support is possible within that framework. I propose to subject these 
claims to critical scrutiny. 
The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, using one traditional 
model for understanding the doctrine of original sin, I construct a formal argument 
to show that no one now bears the burden of original sin. The purpose of this argu-
ment is to bring into sharp focus the problem confronting Kant. In the second sec-
tion, I show how Kant deploys the resources of his practical philosophy to modify 
the traditional model in a way that allows him consistently to reject one of the pre-
misses of that argument and yet to attribute radical evil to every human. In the third 
section, I argue that the theory of moral character Kant uses to formulate his doc-
trine of radical evil is inconsistent with certain further claims he makes about the 
possibility of changing one's moral character. J conclude by suggesting that the 
underlying presuppositions about moral character which lead to this inconsistency 
reflect some deep but problematic features of Christian thinking about human na-
ture and the moral life. 
The Problem Articulated 
One rather crude model for understanding original sin that has appeared in the 
history of Christian thought involves transmission by physical inheritance. On this 
model, Adam and Eve physically transmitted sinfulness and, hence, guilt to their 
progeny, and this process has continued, leaving unaffected only Mary and Jesus, 
and will continue through all generations of offspring of our fIrst human ancestors. 
Kant dismisses this inherited disease model as "inept" (p. 35)' , but it is much worse 
than that. From four plausible principles concerning original sin so conceived, it 
can be shown that no one now bears the burden of original sin. The principles are 
these: 
(A) If anyone now bears the burden of original sin, then he is such that 
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there is some fault with respect to which he is sinful and which he has 
physically inherited. 
(B) If anyone is such that there is any fault with respect to which he is sin-
ful, then he is guilty of bringing about that fault. 
(C) If anyone is guilty of bringing about any fault, then he is accountable 
for that fault. 
(D) If anyone is such that there is any fault which he has physically inher-
ited, then he is not accountable for that fault. 
And the argument, which can be cast in the form of a reductio, is this: 
(1) Suppose someone now bears the burden of original sin. (Hypothesis 
for reductio) 
(2) He is such that there is some fault with respect to which he is sinful and 
which he has physically inherited. (From I and A) 
(3) He is such that he is sinful with respect to that fault. (From 2). 
(4) He is guilty of bringing about that fault. (From 3 and B) 
(5) He is accountable for that fault. (From 4 and C) 
(6) He is such that he has physically inherited that fault. (From 2) 
(7) He is not accountable for that fault. (From 6 and D) 
(8) He is accountable for that fault and he is not accountable for that fault. 
(From 5 and 7) 
(9) Hence, no one now bears the burden of original sin. (From I through 8) 
Since the argument is formally valid, at least one of the four principles, (A)-(D), 
on which it is based must be rejected if its conclusion is to be reasonably denied. 
Various strategies which involve rejecting the inherited disease model have been 
tried out. I shall mention in passing two of them. 
As is well known to Christian philosophers, Jonathan Edwards tried to defend 
the doctrine of original sin by rejecting the claim that there is real personal identity 
through time. On the Edwardian view, persons are no more than aggregates of suc-
cessive, momentary person-stages. Since it is just for God to treat later Adam-
stages as one with the Adam-stage which ate the forbidden fruit, and hence as sin-
ful, even though they did not eat the fruit, it is no less just for God to treat the stages 
of Adam's descendents as one with Adam's stages, and so also as sinful, even if 
they do not literally sin or physically inherit any taint from any of Adam's stages. 
Thus Edwards would reject principle (A). He would say that the person-stages pre-
sently existing do bear the burden of original sin, or at least that it is just and 
reasonable for God by convention to treat them as though they do, despite the fact 
that some of them are such that there is no fault with respect to which they are lit-
erally sinful, guilty and accountable, and even if there is no fault which they have 
physically inherited from Adam. Bizarre though it seems, the Edwardian theory of 
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persons appears to be interna1ly consistent. I have argued elsewhere that it is exter-
nally inconsistent, or at least that we are justified in taking it to be so, and I shall not 
repeat those arguments here. 2 I will, however, venture the opinion that the Edwar-
dian theory is not a particularly plausible candidate for the status of rational re-
placement for the inherited disease model of original sin. 
Kant mentions in passing another strategy which has a certain theological in-
terest. According to this Platonistic view, Adam's descendents do not really begin 
to exist at some time in the interval from conception to birth but existed contem-
poraneously with Adam. And so when Adam first sinned, "we ourselves partici-
pated (although now unconscious of having done so) ... " (p. 36). Someone of this 
opinion would also reject principle (A) and the inherited disease model. Such a 
person would say we bear the burden of original sin because Adam's sin itself is a 
fault with respect to which we are sinful, gUilty and accountable on account of our 
free participation in it, and so of course we do not acquire this fault by physica1 in-
heritance from Adam. As far as I can tell, this view is internally consistent, and I 
doubt that any of us now is in a position to demonstrate that it is externally incon-
sistent. But like the Edwardian view, it strikes me as lacking promise as a rational 
replacement for the inherited disease model. 
Kant too may be read as rejecting principle (A) and the inherited disease model. 
But his alternative strikes me, initially at least, as a promising and plausible re-
placement for that model. And so I now tum to the task of explicating the Kantian 
alternative. 
Radical Evil in Human Nature 
In discussing the contents of Book One of the Religion, I shall focus on those 
points which are salient for appreciating how Kant's doctrine of radica1 evil consti-
tutes a rationalization of the doctrine of origina1 sin. Emphasis will be placed on 
Kant's views of human nature, willing and moral character. In order not to inter-
rupt the flow of my exegetical argument, I shall relegate discussion of my disag-
reements with some prominent commentators to the footnotes. 
According to Kant, human nature contains an original predisposition (Anlage) 
to good that can be functiona1ly analyzed into three constituents, themselves pre-
dispositions, which are elements in the fixed character and destiny (Bestimmung) 
of humankind. First, there is the predisposition to anima1ity, which Kant subsumes 
under the general concept of "physical and purely mechanical self-love, wherein 
no reason is demanded" (p. 22). This predisposition consists of instinctive drives 
for such things as self-preservation, propagation by means of sexuality, and the so-
ciety of one's own kind. It is something we have in common with other anima1 
species in virtue of a shared anima1 nature. Second, there is the predisposition to 
humanity, which Kant subsumes under the general concept of self-love which is 
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not merely instinctual but also rational. It is based on practical reason, Kant tells 
us, "but a reason thereby subservient to other incentives" (p. 23), namely, the in-
centives rooted in our sensuous nature. Hence, the kind of practical reason in-
volved in the predisposition to humanity is instrumental or means-end reasoning of 
the sort Hume had in mind when he declared reason to be the slave of the passions. 
What is distinctive about Kant's view is that he holds that reason can also be "prac-
tical of itself' (p. 23), that is, dictate moral laws unconditionally, and so he claims 
a third predisposition for human nature. This is the predisposition to personality, 
which we have in virtue of being both rational and accountable for our actions. 
Kant describes it as "the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a suffi-
cient incentive ofthe will" (pp. 22-23). It is, of course, an indication of the impor-
tance of the moral realm in Kant's mature philosophy that he includes what he 
takes to be distincti ve of us as rational moral agents among the characteristic marks 
of human nature. 
To say that these predispositions are original is, for Kant, to say that "they are 
bound up with the possibility of human nature" (p. 23). In other words, an indi-
vidual could not lack any of them and still be a normal, mature human; they are es-
sential attributes of normal, mature humans. It is for this reason that Kant calls 
them elements in the fixed character and destiny of man. To say they are predispos-
itions to good is, for Kant, to say that they "are not only good in negative fashion 
(in that they do not contradict the moral law); they are also predispositions toward 
good (they enjoin observance of the law)" (p. 23). Of course no one is morally 
good simply in virtue of possessing them, for no one is accountable for having 
them. But since they predispose us toward moral good, whence then comes moral 
evil? If we have essentially the capacity for respect for the moral law to serve by it-
self as a sufficient incentive of the will, why is that capacity not exercised in each 
morally significant action we perform? Why does respect for the moral law some-
times fail to serve as a sufficient incentive for the will? 
According to Kant, the ultimate answers to these questions are to be given in 
terms of a propensity to moral evil. Because for Kant moral evil must be tied up 
with the exercise of a free will' and a free will can be morally evil only in virtue of 
the maxims it adopts, a propensity to moral evil must be "the subjective ground of 
the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law" (p. 24). As the 
ground in the agent for the possibility of the deviation of the maxims of particular 
actions from the moral law , the propensity to moral evil must be in the agent an-
tecedent to the adoption by the agent of the maxims of particular actions. Hence it 
must be represented as innate in the agent. And yet because Kant is convinced that 
a propensity to moral evil is itself something morally evil, it must also result from 
an exercise of the agent's will for which the agent is accountable. And so Kant 
needs to claim that a propensity (Hang) can be distinguished from a predisposition 
(Anlage) by the fact that "although it can indeed be innate, it ought not to be rep-
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resented merely thus; for it can also be regarded as having been acquired (if it is 
good), or brought by man upon himself (if it is evil)" (p. 24). 
But how is this possible? If a characteristic is innate in a person, then it would 
seem that person is no more accountable for it than for anything else he or she got 
in the natural lottery . Innate attributes, even if they are accidental rather than es-
sential to their possessors, seem to be things which are themselves neither morally 
good nor morally evil. If a characteristic of a person is morally evil, then it would 
seem that person acquired it through some particular free act or acts rather than 
possessing it antecedent to all such particular acts. Characteristics which are mor-
ally evil and for which one is accountable seem not to be things which could be in-
nate in an agent. Outright inconsistency seems to be lurking just around the comer. 
Kant thinks he has a way to avoid such inconsistency. If moral evil is to be attri-
buted to a person or to a person's character and not just to particular actions the per-
son freely performs, then we must attribute to the person not only particular evil 
maxims for his or her particular morally evil free actions at various times but also 
"an underlying common ground, itself a maxim, of all particular morally-evil 
maxims" (p. 16, my italics). Kant tells us we may think of such a maxim as a rule 
the will makes for the use of its freedom which "applies universally to the whole 
use of freedom" (p. 20). Such a maxim must be supreme in the sense that, because 
its adoption is the work of a free will, we can no more find a further causal expla-
nation for it "than we can assign a cause for any fundamental attribute belonging to 
our nature" (p. 27). Because the adoption of a supreme maxim is an exercise of 
freedom, it is an act for which the agent is accountable. The propensity to moral 
evil is therefore itself a morally evil act in this sense and is also the ground of all 
morally evil particular actions. But it is, Kant goes on to say, "intelligible action, 
cognizable by means of pure reason alone, apart from every temporal condition" 
(pp. 26-27). And just because it can be understood to be this peculiar sort of atem-
poral free act which is nevertheless the common ground underlying the whole use 
in time of an agent's freedom, it can be represented as always in the agent serving 
as a ground for all his or her particular actions at particular times. For this reason, 
it is not misleading to represent a propensity to moral evil both as innate in the 
sense that it is present in the agent independent of and therefore antecedent to all 
exercises of freedom in time and as inextirpable in the sense that it cannot be eradi-
cated by means of exercises of freedom in time. 
Thus the picture of the propensity to moral evil which emerges from Kant's dis-
cussion is this. The agent's will freely but independent of all temporal conditions 
adopts an evil supreme maxim. The evil supreme maxim is a rule or general policy 
which covers every exercise of the agent's freedom in time and thereby provides a 
ground in the agent for all his or her particular morally evil actions at particular 
times. This general policy does not causally necessitate particular actions at par-
ticular times; particular actions at particular times too must be exercises of freedom 
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if they are to be morally good or evil. This is why its adoption only grounds the 
possibility of the deviation of the maxims of particular actions from the moral law 
and why it establishes only a propensity to moral evil in particular actions. 
Nevertheless, the propensity is itself morally evil because it springs from an exer-
cise of freedom, and it can be represented as being present in the agent before, dur-
ing and after all exercises of the agent's freedom in time in virtue of being under-
standable as being independent of all temporal conditions. It is not the sort of thing 
an agent could gain or lose in the course of time. However, it is what makes an 
agent's character, as opposed to his or her individual actions, morally evil, and so 
it provides the agent with moral identity. An agent has a morally evil character just 
in case he or she has a propensity to moral evil. 
Since the propensity to moral evil is a product of freedom, it cannot be an essen-
tial element in human nature as is the predisposition to good. If moral evil is to be 
attributed to mankind as a species, it must be a contingent and accidental attribute 
of each member of the species. For this reason, the claim that man is evil 'by na-
ture' is not to be justified by philosophical analysis of human nature. Its justifica-
tion, Kant tells us, is rather "that from what we know of man through experience 
we cannot judge otherwise of him, or, that we may presuppose evil to be subjec-
tively necessary to every man, even to the best" (p. 27). As Kant reads the histor-
ical evidence, it provides plenty of inductive support for such a presupposition. 
Primitive peoples are barbaric and cruel, civilized peoples are vicious and de-
praved, and nations are no better than primitive individuals. Kant's pessimism 
puts him on the side of Hobbes in his assessment of the moral evil in the state of na-
ture and on the side of Rousseau in his judgment of the moral evil in the civilized 
state. And so Kant takes himself to have good inductive support for attributing a 
morally evil propensity to moral evil to mankind universally. 
But it seems very improbable that a propensity to moral evil should be both a 
product of freedom and universal among mankind. Because the adoption of an evil 
supreme maxim is an absolutely spontaneous exercise of the will, it is antecedently 
likely that some people would have freely adopted a morally good supreme maxim 
while others adopted a morally evil supreme maxim. Even if it is impossible to as-
sign numerical values to the prior probabilities of the various alternatives, it seems 
clear enough that the prior probability of all humans choosing freely a morally evil 
supreme maxim must be quite low. Being well aware of this, Kant tells us that the 
freedom of the choice of a supreme maxim "will not tally with the universality of 
this evil unless the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims somehow or other is 
entwined with and, as it were, rooted in humanity itself' (pp. 27-28). So Kant sees 
quite clearly that the universality he attributes to the propensity to moral evil needs 
an explanation of some sort. Yet how can he root the propensity in human nature it-
self without compromising or qualifying his claim that it is a product of freedom 
for which people are accountable? 
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Kant considers and rejects two possible answers to this question. The propensity 
to moral evil cannot originate in the natural inclinations arising from our sensuous 
nature. In the first place, they are part of the predisposition to animality, which 
Kant consistently holds to be a predisposition to good; indeed, "they afford the oc-
casion for what the moral disposition in its power can manifest, namely, virtue" (p. 
30). In the second place, because "they are implanted in us" and "we are not their 
authors" (p. 30), we are not accountable for them, though we are accountable for 
the propensity to moral evil. Nor can the propensity to moral evil originate in a cor-
ruption of the morally legislative function of reason. A being in whom opposition 
to the moral law was an incentive to action would, Kant thinks, be a devilish being; 
such a being would lack the predisposition to personality, which is essential to nor-
mal, mature humans. In the case of man, the moral law "forces itself upon him ir-
resistibly by virtue of his moral predisposition" (p. 31). A human simply cannot, 
as Kant sees it, flat out renounce the moral law in the manner of a rebel; no matter 
what a human being does, the moral law cannot cease to exert its influence as an in-
centive.4 
According to Kant, "freedom of the will is of a wholly unique nature in that an 
incentive can determine the will to an action only so far as the individual has incor-
porated it into his maxim (has made it the general rule in accordance with which he 
will conduct himself); only thus can an incentive whatever it may be, co-exist with 
the absolute spontaneity of the will (i.e., freedom)" (p. 19). Incentives by them-
selves never causally determine the will to action; a will so determined would not 
be free. Incentives, so to speak, clamor for our attention and press us to act on 
them. But it is up to us to decide which incentives shall determine the will to action 
by choosing freely how incenti ves shall be incorporated into the maxims of our ac-
tions. In virtue of our natural predispositions, we are always confronted with in-
centives of two sorts. In virtue of the predisposition to personality, respect for the 
moral law is an incentive for us; in virtue of the predisposition to animality, the in-
clinations which arise from our sensuous nature are also incentives for us. If incen-
tives of either sort were present alone and incentives of the other sort absent, the 
agent would adopt incentives of the sort present into his or her maxim and those in-
centives would thereby come to serve as the sole and sufficient determining ground 
of the agent's will. But since incentives of both sorts will inevitably press us so 
long as we remain human, the will must cope with or respond to incentives of both 
sorts whenever it frames a maxim for action. Because incentives of the two sorts 
sometimes press for the same action but sometimes conflict, it will only be acci-
dental if both sorts of incentives press the agent in the same direction. So if the 
will's maxim is to have the form of a general or generalizable rule, it must subor-
dinate incentives of the one sort to those of the other in order to cover cases where 
incentives conflict. A good maxim is one in which the incentives of inclination are 
subordinated to the incentive of respect for the moral law; an evil maxim is one 
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which lacks this subordination. 
At the level of the choice of a supreme maxim which is to serve as a policy for the 
whole use of one's freedom, Kant will admit only two possibilities. Either the su-
preme maxim is good or it is evil; Kant's rigorism allows for no third alternative. 
Kant tells us that it is "of great consequence to ethics in general to avoid admitting, 
so long as it is possible, of anything morally intermediate, whether in actions 
(adiophora) or in human characters" (p. 18). This rigorism is intended to rule out 
the possibility of moral characters which are either (i) morally good in some re-
spects and morally evil in others or (ii) neither morally good nor morally evil. So 
the good person's policy is to make pursuit of the satisfaction of his sensuous incli-
nations always subordinate to obedience to the moral law . Any other policy is the 
policy of an evil person, for it lacks the proper moral order of subordination of in-
centives. This implies that Kant is committed to holding that it would be evil even 
to incorporate the moral incentive and the incentives of inclination into one's 
maxim on an equal footing in cases where incentives of both sorts press toward the 
same action. And in discussing impurity, which he regards as one of three degrees 
in which the propensity to moral evil manifests itself, Kant does say that "although 
the maxim is indeed good in respect of its object (the intended observance of the 
law) and perhaps even strong enough for practice, it is not yet purely moral; that is, 
it has not, as it should have, adopted the law alone as its all-sufficient incentive" 
(p. 25). Any policy which is not purely moral because it does not make respect for 
the law its sufficient incentive and subordinate all other incentives to respect for 
the law must, on the rigoristic view, be an evil policy. And so when Kant tells us 
that "man (even the best) is evil only in that he reverses the moral order of the in-
centives when he adopts them into his maxim" (p. 31), we must, if we wish to at-
tribute to Kant a consistent view, understand reversals of the moral order of the in-
centives broadly as any failure to preserve the proper subordination of the incen-
tives of inclination to the moral incentive and not narrowly as merely those failures 
which consist in subordinating the moral incentive to the incentives of inclination. 
To subordinate the moral incentive to the incentives of inclination is to exhibit wic-
kedness, which Kant regards as the third and worst degree in which the propensity 
to moral evil manifests itself and which he characterizes as "the propensity of the 
will to maxims which neglect the incentives springing from the moral law in favor 
of others which are not moral" (p. 25).' 
A person's failure to preserve the proper and purely moral order of incentives 
when he or she incorporates them into a supreme maxim explains how the propen-
sity to moral evil can be both rooted in human nature, in that it is made possible by 
the inevitable presence in humans of incentives of two kinds which can, and often 
do, come into conflict, and also a product of freedom, in that it consists of a free 
choice of a supreme maxim which does not always give obedience to the moral law 
pride of place over pursuit of the satisfaction of sensuous inclinations. And it 
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seems reasonable enough to suppose that such a policy is, implicitly at least, uni-
versal among mankind. 
As I said above, a propensity to moral evil in an agent does not causally neces-
sitate particular morally evil actions at particular times. Particular actions too are 
products of the freedom of absolute spontaneity. And so Kant can consistently 
maintain that it is possible for an agent to "overcome" (p. 32) the propensity to 
moral evil in that he or she can perform many good actions in the course of time de-
spite the presence of the propensity to moral evil in him or her. What an agent can-
not do is to extirpate or eradicate the propensity in the course of time because it is 
an act independent of all temporal conditions which is the ultimate ground in the 
agent of all maxims of particular actions at particular times. 
Kant's theory of a universal human propensity to moral evil which is itself mor-
ally evil seems to me a very good candidate for the job of rationalizing the Christ-
ian doctrine of original sin. I think Kant's theory does a measure of justice to sev-
eral important intuitions which underlie the doctrine of original sin. First, this 
propensity is a moral evil which is a product of freedom and for which the agent is 
accountable. Second, it is radical in the sense that it goes to the root of the exercise 
of human freedom and is, so to speak, entwined with human nature. Third, it is 
constitutive of the agent's moral character and identity and, being universal among 
human agents, may be said to belong to humans 'by nature'. And, fourth, because 
it is the result of an act independent of temporal conditions, it may be represented 
from the point of view of the temporal realm as present in the agent in such a way 
as to be antecedent to all particular actions at particular times and, hence, innate 
and inextirpable by the agent in the course of time. I know of no rational recon-
struction of the doctrine of original sin that preserves more of these intuitions than 
Kant's theory of radical evil does. Moreover, as far as I can tell, the theory is inter-
nally consistent or, more cautiously, is logically possible if it is logically possible 
for there to be human acts of will which are both absolutely spontaneous and inde-
pendent of all temporal conditions. While I have no proof that such acts are possi-
ble, I also know of no proof that they are impossible. And although such acts, if 
they occurred, would admittedly have to be inexplicable and mysterious in some 
ways, I believe we can get some idea of how they might occur, if only by analogy, 
from the theological discussion of how spontaneous acts of will are possible for a 
timeless God. 
Radical Transformation of Moral Identity 
It would have been nice if Kant had stopped at this point in the exposition of his 
theory and said no more in Book One of the Religion. Alas, he did not. Kant also 
holds that human agents are capable of effecting a revolution whereby a morally 
evil supreme maxim is replaced by a morally good supreme maxim. Thereby the 
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person becomes, so to speak, a new man "by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new cre-
ation (John III, 5; compare also Genesis 1,2), and a change of heart" (p. 43). How 
is it possible for a person who begins as a morally evil person to become by his or 
her own powers a morally good person? That it is possible Kant has no doubt, for 
he holds that because we ought to do, we can do it, since nothing is demanded of us 
by morality which we cannot do. Kant thinks we can avoid problems if we say 
"that man is under the necessity of, and is therefore capable of, a revolution in his 
cast of mind, but only of a gradual reform in his sensuous nature (which places ob-
stacles in the way of the former)" (p. 43). And he goes on to explain that "if a man 
reverses, by a single unchangeable decision, that highest ground of his maxims 
whereby he was an evil man (and thus puts on the new man), he is, so far as his 
principle and cast of mind are concerned, a subject susceptible of goodness, but 
only in continuous labor and growth is he a good man" (p. 43).6 Such a reversal 
would, Kant thinks, restore to the predisposition to personality its original purity 
and power. 
But Kant confronts a serious difficulty here and knows it, for he goes on to ask 
whether such a restoration through one's own efforts is inconsistent with the as-
sumption of an antecedently inherent morally evil propensity to moral evil. He an-
swers: "Yes, to be sure, as far as the conceivability, i.e., our insight into the pos-
sibility, of such restoration is concerned" (p. 46). But he claims that the assump-
tion in question is not really inconsistent with the possibility of such a restoration 
just because "when the moral law commands that we ought now to be better men, 
it follows inevitably that we must be able to be better men" (p. 46). Unfortunately, 
these remarks do not solve the problem. We not only lack insight into how it is pos-
sible for a human agent both to have a morally evil propensity to moral evil and to 
reverse the highest ground of his or her maxims by a single unchangeable decision. 
In addition, it can be demonstrated, I believe, that these two things are not compos-
sible, and so we have positive insight into their joint impo~ibility. 
More precisely, if Kant supposes that a moral revolution ever occurs, then he is 
committed to an inconsistent triad of claims. One is the thesis of radical evil itself, 
according to which every human by an act independent of all temporal conditions 
has adopted a morally evil supreme maxim that makes his or her moral character 
evil and that is inextirpable. The second is the thesis of rigorism, according to 
which a human's moral character cannot be a mixture of good and evil, and so can 
be constituted by at most one supreme maxim, and cannot be neither good nor evil, 
and so must be constituted by at least one supreme maxim. And the third is the 
thesis of moral revolution, according to which some human by a single unchange-
able decision reverses the highest ground of his or her maxims and adopts a mor-
ally good supreme maxim. 
Now consider the following line of argument. Suppose some human adopts a 
morally good supreme maxim. Either a morally good supreme maxim coexists in 
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that human with a morally evil supreme maxim, or it does not. If it does, then that 
human has two supreme maxims, one good and the other evil, and his or her moral 
character is a mixture of good and evil, which contradicts the thesis of rigorism. If 
it does not, then either that human has not adopted a morally evil supreme maxim 
or that human had at one time adopted a morally evil supreme maxim and at some 
later time given it up and replaced it with a morally good supreme maxim. But the 
assumption that that human has not adopted a morally evil supreme maxim con-
tradicts the part of the thesis of radical evil which asserts that every human has 
adopted a morally evil supreme maxim. And the supposition that that human had at 
one time adopted a morally evil supreme maxim and at some later time given it up 
contradicts the part of the thesis of radical evil which asserts that a morally evil su-
preme maxim, because it is the product of an act independent of all temporal con-
ditions, is inextirpable once adopted. Hence, no human adopts a morally good su-
preme maxim. 
It is important to be clear about just what I take this argument to establish. It does 
not show that no human can adopt a morally good supreme maxim; in other words, 
it does not show that there is no possible world in which some human does freely 
adopt a morally good supreme maxim. Indeed, any argument which demonstrated 
this would show too much, for it would establish that all humans adopt a morally 
evil supreme maxim of necessity. What the argument does show is that there is no 
possible world in which (i) the thesis of rigorism is true, (ii) every human adopts a 
morally evil supreme maxim, and (iii) some human adopts a morally good su-
preme maxim. But this suffices to establish that it is not possible for the thesis of 
rigorism to be true, for every human to adopt a morally evil supreme maxim, and 
for some human to adopt a morally good supreme maxim. And this in tum is 
enough to show that it is not possible, given the thesis of rigorism, for a moral rev-
olution, that is, a change or reversal of supreme maxims, to occur in any single 
human person. If a person adopts a morally evil supreme maxim, then any person 
who adopts a morally good supreme maxim is literally a different person and so, 
literally and not just 'as it were', a new man and a new creation. A difference in 
moral identity this deep requires a difference in personal identity if we are to re-
main within the bounds of Kant's theory. Or, at any rate, so I have argued. 
And if we ask, in a Kantian spirit, whether we ought to effect a moral revolution 
in oiIr characters by a reversal of supreme maxims from evil to good, then I think 
we should conclude that we ought not because we cannot. It is, perhaps, a tribute 
to Kant's humaneness that he wishes to hold out to us the prospect of a revolution 
in moral character. Unfortunately, the logic of his own theory forbids it. All that 
theory allows is incessant struggle against the propensity to moral evil by means of 
particular good actions. Thus, Kant's attempt to rationalize the Christian doctrine 
of original sin must be judged a failure because his theory of radical evil is incon-
sistent with the conjuction of two other claims equally central to his mature practi-
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cal philosophy, the thesis of rigorism and the thesis of moral revolution. 
Could another philosophical theory succeed where Kant's theory has come to 
grief? The question is obviously a difficult one, and I can offer no definitive an-
swer. However, I should like to conclude by making some tentative and rather 
speculative remarks about why this appears to me unlikely. 
One approach would be to abandon the attempt to rationalize the doctrine of 
original sin within the categories of Kant's philosophy and to try to reconstruct that 
doctrine with the resources of some other conceptual framework. To take just one 
example from post-Kantian thought, one might construe the assertion that almost 
all human persons bear the burden of original sin as claiming that almost all human 
persons are in a state of alienation from God. However, a mere terminological shift 
obviously will not solve all the problems Kant grappled with. With respect to any 
human who is alleged to be in this alienated state, we may ask whether his or her 
being in such a state is a product of the exercise of his or her freedom or not. If it is 
not, then it is a mere misfortune and not something he or she is guilty of or account-
able for, and so it is at best misleading to assimilate it to the category of sin. If it is, 
then one must work out some piece of theory similar to the disease model of phys-
ical transmission or Kant's model of a free act independent of all temporal condi-
tions to explain how it can be, apparently, innate in the moral character. In short, 
the problems Kant confronted and tried to solve are real, and they cannot be dis-
olved or made to disappear merely by a switch of conceptual frameworks. 
In fact, I believe these problems arise from a very deep tension in typically 
Christian views of the human situation. Let me try to express that tension in a stark 
and simple fashion. Two presuppositions are that human characters as well as indi-
vidual actions are proper subjects of moral evaluation and that human characters 
are products of the exercise of freedom to the extent that they are properly so 
evaluated. On the one hand, there is the intuition that almost all human characters 
are innately and ineradicably stained in a way that is properly subject to a negative 
moral evaluation because it is somehow self-incurred. This somber assessment of 
the human situation can strike one as quite realistic when examining one's own 
inner life or the historical record in certain frames of mind. On the other hand, 
there is the intuition that only a human character which was spotless and so prop-
erly subject to a wholly positive moral evaluation could find favor with, and be jus-
tified in the eyes of, a morally perfect God. This demand for purity and perfection 
of moral character is just what one would expect from a God who is himself mor-
ally perfect in every respect. If these two intuitions are coupled with the hope that 
nonetheless some of us may be justified in the eyes of God in a way which is not 
capricious but is in accord with his essential perfect justice, then it may seem as if 
the moral characters experience teaches us we have must be completely different 
from the moral characters we would have to have if the hope were to have any 
foundation. And so the hope may seem sensible only if miraculous discontinuities 
SIN, EVIL, MORAL IDENTITY 201 
in moral character, breaks so sharp they would appear destructive of moral and 
perhaps even personal identity, are possible. In my opinion, Kant accepted the two 
presuppositions, found the two intuitions compelling, and tried to resolve the ten-
sion between them in order to make room for the hope. I consider Kant's attempt a 
splendid and instructive failure because it teaches by example how difficult the 
project of effecting a philosophical reconciliation between the two intuitions will 
be if it is carried out with rigor and attention to detail. 
Confronting this tension, many theologians will attempt a resolution by appeal 
to the miracle of divine grace and mercy. Whether such an appeal is available to a 
philosopher, within the bounds of Kantian reason or outside those limits, and, if 
so, whether it can succeed must be topics reserved for another paper. 7 
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